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We study the causal relation between private wealth and retirement age. We propose two 
estimation strategies based on expected retirement age. The outcome variable is observed 
repeatedly over time. We correct first for the unobserved heterogeneity in the disutility of 
work by using panel data techniques. Next, we exploit information on expected wealth 
accumulation in order to identify the unexpected component in wealth accumulation. In line 
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The average real level of nancial wealth of Dutch Households has increased from e 28,000
in 2000 to about e 48,000 in 2007.1 Poterba (2000) shows a similar pattern for the United
States between 1990 and 2000. Like most other countries Dutch citizens have witnessed a
drop in the value of their wealth holdings due to the recession in years 2008 and 2009. The
large increases and decreases in nancial wealth holdings is of interest for current policy
that aims to increase the labor force participation of elderly workers. Elderly workers may
use the increased level of nancial wealth to enjoy retirement earlier in life, while this desire
may be opposed by an unexpected decrease in the level of nancial wealth. It is therefore
interesting to study the relation between private wealth and retirement plans.
The empirical evidence on the relationship between private wealth and retirement be-
havior is not particularly strong. Early contributions by Diamond and Hausman (1984) and
Samwick (1998) investigate the eect of private wealth holdings in the United States in the
1970's and 1980's. Diamond and Hausman (1984) use data from the National Longitudinal
Survey (NLS) of men who reach retirement between 1966 and 1976. They nd that nan-
cial wealth has almost no eect on the timing of retirement. This is a somewhat surprising
result. Dierences in wealth holdings may be due to dierent saving decisions in the past.
Individuals, who prefer to retire early, plan their saving behavior in order to be able to
nance early retirement. This leads to an endogeneity problem when studying the causal
eect of private wealth on retirement. The endogeneity should actually lead to an upward
bias in the impact of private wealth on retirement. Likewise, Samwick (1998) nds a small
positive but non signicant eect of nancial wealth on the probability of retirement, using
data from the 1983 and 1986 Survey of Consumer Finances. For the Netherlands, Bloemen
(2010), using data from the Socio-Economic panel for the years 1995 through 2002, nds a
small and positive eect of nancial wealth on the timing of retirement.2
The small wealth eect may be caused by other unobserved eects such as risk aversion.
Those who are more concerned about a nancially secure retirement will retire later and
accumulate more wealth than those who are less concerned (Hurd 2009b). A standard
approach in the literature to identify a causal wealth eect on the retirement age is to
use unexpected changes in wealth which are unrelated to individual preferences, derived
for instance from lotteries (Imbens, Rubin, and Sacerdote 2001), unexpected stock market
appreciation or depreciation (Hurd 2009a) or received bequests (Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and
1Households age 40 to 65, source Dutch National Bank Household Survey (DHS).
2Using his results we have calculated that an increase in the level of wealth by an average yearly salary
(about e32,000) leads to a decrease in the retirement age by six weeks. This implies an income eect of
approximately 10 percent. This is computed relating the amount of weeks shift due to a one year salary
exogenous shock, divided by 52 weeks.
2Rosen 1993).3 In our study, panel data will allow us to control for time-constant unobserved
dierences in preferences. We show new evidence on the eect of private wealth on retirement
by using a panel dataset from the Netherlands from 1994 to 2009. We carry out two types
of estimations that aim to isolate the causal eect of private wealth on retirement.
First, with repeated observations over time for the same individuals it is possible to
control for unobserved, but time constant eects. Chan and Stevens (2004) use a similar
strategy to study the eect of retirement incentives on retirement behavior. Since actual
retirement (which generally means a permanent withdrawal from the labor market) will be
observed only once, actual retirement behavior would be of little use in our analysis. We
use a repeated question about the workers planned retirement age. As long as there are no
unanticipated shocks, nor changes in nancial literacy, the workers planned retirement age
should stay constant over time. This is irrespective of the amount of wealth accumulation
because of dierences in preferences for early retirement.
The literature shows that the planned retirement age is a useful variable to study retire-
ment behavior. Bernheim (1989) was the rst to relate retirement expectations to realiza-
tions Disney and Tanner (2003) nd that dierences between the planned retirement age
and the actual retirement age are related to health shocks and changes in marital status.
A recent study by Benitez-Silva and Dwyer (2005) looks at the formation of retirement ex-
pectations more in depth. They provide evidence that individuals correctly anticipate most
uncertain events when planning their retirement except for health related shocks.
One type of concern associated with panel data is that the unobserved eects might
not be constant over time. Their might be other events, such as public discussions about
future pension reforms, which are both associated with changes in wealth accumulation
and the planned retirement age. The period of analysis is characterized by several pension
debates which may aect individuals attitude towards the retirement age. Moreover, the
individual disutility of work may increase over age because of physical constraints or health
related problems. Such issues may alter the optimal consumption and employment path
over the life cycle, aecting both wealth accumulation and retirement plans. We therefore
show a second set of estimations. We isolate unexpected changes in wealth using data on
self reported expectations about future wealth accumulation, rather than only relying on
panel data techniques under the hypothesis of a constant disutility of work over time. Our
3Imbens, Rubin, and Sacerdote (2001) nd that lottery winners spend about 11 percent of their prize on
buying leisure. Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen (1993) nd that individuals who receive a large inheritance
had a 18 percent greater chance to drop out of the labor force, though they might have anticipated bequest.
Brown, Coile, and Weisbenner (2010) nd that the causal impact of an unanticipated inheritance on the
probability of retiring earlier is substantial. (Hurd 2009b) nd no evidence that workers in households who
had large stock market gains retired earlier than they had anticipated or that they revised their retirement
expectations relative to workers in households that had no large gains.
3main result is that the eect of private wealth on the planned retirement age is statistically
signicant but small.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we brie
y describe the evolution of the
early retirement system in the Netherlands. In Section 3 we specify a simple theoretical
model about the relationship between wealth and the planned retirement age and discuss
how we use this model to estimate the wealth eect. In Section 4 we describe the data used
in this analysis and show descriptive evidence of the relationship between the level of private
wealth and the planned retirement age. In Section 5 we present the estimation results and
section 6 concludes. In the Appendix we show the formal derivation discussed in Section 3
and discuss empirical ndings on pension wealth.
2 Dutch pension and early retirement system
In the period of analysis there where several reforms of the early retirement system which
signicantly reduced the replacement rate for individuals who plan to retire early. We
therefore rst describe the evolution of the Dutch early retirement system during this period
of time.4
The Dutch pension system is organized in a rst and a second pillar. The rst pillar is
the public pension system. It provides a 
at rate pension benet, which is related to the net
minimum wage. This is accessible at the statutory age of 65. The second pillar consists of
an occupational pension system, which covers most employees. Participation is mandatory
for all employees when an employer oers a pension scheme. These pensions schemes are
negotiated between unions and employers organizations at the sector or rm level. Because
of this regulation, more than 80% of the Dutch workers are mandated to save in such a
scheme (Bovenberg and Gradus 2008). Pension savings in the second pillar are facilitated
by the government through a preferential tax treatment. There are large tax advantages on
pensions savings due to the progressive tax system.
Since 2006, the Dutch early retirement system is integrated within the second pillar
pension system. Before this date the early retirement system was separated. The early
retirement scheme was introduced in the late 1970's and early 1980's to give elderly workers
an incentive to retire before the age of 65. Exact conditions varied by sector, but the early
retirement scheme typically provided 
at rate benets that were equal to 80% of the last
earned wage (Kapteyn and de Vos 1984). Furthermore, while in early retirement, the
old age pension entitlement continued to grow even though the employee stopped working.
The eligibility age of the early retirement schemes was typically 60 or 61. Because of the
4In the Appendix we analyze the eect of the changes to pension wealth due to these policy shifts on
planned retirement, which also appears to be modest.
4aging population and the low labor participation of the elderly, these pay-as- you-go early
retirement schemes became an increasing burden for the working population and employers.
From the late 1990's onwards the early retirement schemes were replaced by capital funded
pre-pension schemes in which workers save for their own early retirement. In most sectors, it
was decided to implement transitional arrangements in order to smooth the transition from
the 
at-rate early retirement schemes to the actuarially adjusted pre-pension schemes. The
complete transition should be completed in 2022. The government still facilitated saving for
early retirement in these pre-pension schemes by a special scal treatment as in the second
pillar system.
As from January 1, 2006, the Dutch government installed a new law on early retirement.
This law is called the Early Retirement and Life-Course Saving Arrangement Act (Wet
VPL). The new law on early retirement abolished the special scal treatment for early
retirement for individuals born after 1949. At the same time, the pre-pension schemes
where transformed into actuarially fair schemes. This implied a substantial drop in pension
benets for people born after 1949 who planned to retire at the early entitlement age. For
example, the replacement rate of public sector workers droped from 70 percent to 64 percent
of average yearly earnings (de Grip, Lindeboom, and Montizaan 2009).
The life-course savings arrangement allows tax free saving up to 12 percent of annual
earnings in a saving account that can be used to nance temporary leaves from work, such
as sabbaticals, or early retirement. Individuals who where born in the years 1950 through
1954 are allowed to save more than 12 percent of their annual earning to supplement their
early retirement savings. More than half of the individuals that participate in the life-
course savings arrangement claim to do this for early retirement purposes.5 This makes
early retirement by far the most important purpose to participate in the arrangement.
3 Methodology
3.1 Theoretical Framework
In this section we construct a simple theoretical framework to model the factors that aect
the retirement age in order to introduce the estimation equation to assess the eect of private
wealth on retirement. We consider a household i who lives for a length of T periods. For
each period t the household chooses how much to consume cit and decides whether to work
or retire. Our model is close to Bloom, Canning, Manseld, and Moore (2007).
The function it indicates whether the household is working, it = 1 or retired, it = 0.
We consider only full-time work or retirement and rule out gradual retirement since we are
5Source: Statistics Netherlands, Labor Force Survey.
5only interested in the participation decision. Workers earn the constant wage wi during
working life which is added to wealth, while consumption cit reduces wealth. The introduc-
tion of income uncertainty as in Hall (1978) leads to the accumulation of wealth as a buer
of precautionary saving. In our model we do not incorporate uncertainty. The unanticipated
shocks to wealth are completely exogenous. We assume the wage to be constant over time
to facilitate the optimization problem. A time varying wage would induce precautionary
savings as an additional motive but would not alter our main conclusions. Households can
borrow and lend as much as they desire at the interest rate r.
The household derives utility Ui() from consumption and disutility from working.6 The
disutility of work ai diers between households and is constant over time. This implies that
the total disutility of work increases when the household works longer because of additive
preferences.





e t[(u(cit)   itai)]dt; (1)
where future utility is discounted at the subjective rate of time preference . The dis-
count function is exponential which implies that delaying consumption reduces the value
of consumption at a constant rate over time. Households maximize their lifetime expected
utility subject to the budget constraint
@Ait
@t
= itwi + rAit   cit; (2)
where Ait represents the level of accumulated wealth in period t. We derive the following
equations by taking the rst-order conditions for a maximum in cit and it. Our derivation
is similar to that of Bloom, Canning, Manseld, and Moore (2007).
@cit
@t








it = 1 , U
0
it(cit)wi  ai: (4)
6We ignore the consumption of leisure time. By including preferences for leisure-time in the life-cycle
model, Heckman (1974) shows that individuals prefer to reduce hours of work gradually at later ages, labor
supply choices at the intensive margin. We are only interested in the participation decision of elderly workers,
the extensive margin. The exclusion of preferences for leisure simplies our model without altering the main
conclusions.
6The rst equation implies that households prefer a rising level of consumption over the
life-cycle if the interest rate is larger than the discount rate and the utility function is con-
cave, i.e. U
00
it(cit) < 0. This eect is small if the marginal utility of consumption falls quickly
with the level of consumption. Which implies that households want to smooth consump-
tion over their life-cycle, given their valuation of future consumption and the interest rate at
which they are able to borrow and save. When the marginal utility of consumption in a par-
ticular period exceeds the marginal utility of consumption in other periods, households can
increase utility by shifting resources from other periods to that particular period until the
marginal utility is equalized across periods. Most empirical studies however nd a discount
rate that is larger than the interest rate implying that individuals are impatient and pre-
fer current consumption over future consumption (Frederick, Loewenstein, and O'donoghue
2002).
The second equation implies that the household retires at time t if the disutility of work
exceeds the utility gain from more consumption by working longer (the marginal utility of
consumption multiplied by the wage). Households with a higher disutility of work will retire
earlier and have a lower level of consumption in each period (given the wage) relative to
households who like working more. Which implies that they will hold more pre-retirement
assets to nance the longer period of retirement without a sharp cutback in consumption.
The model states that households with a high disutility of work accumulate wealth
for earlier retirement. However, when there are any remaining exogenous changes which
aect the level of wealth upon retirement (given the wage) households should adjust their
retirement plans and re-optimize their path of consumption. An unpredicted increase in
wealth will lead to a higher level of accumulated assets. This will lead to a higher level of
lifetime consumption. The higher level of consumption will induce a lower marginal utility
of consumption. This increases the disutility of work and encourages earlier retirement.
To summarize, the relationship between wealth and planned retirement age (PRA) is
endogenous. How much pre-retirement wealth (given the wage) a household accumulates
depends on the planned retirement age which is determined by the disutility of labor. Fur-
thermore, there is a causal impact of wealth (given the wage) on the planned retirement
age, due to an unexpected (or in other words exogenous) increase in wealth. In a simple
dynamic optimization framework, when the interest rate equals the rate of time preference,
the basic relation can be written as PRAi = f(Ai;t=wi;ai) (see Appendix).
3.2 Empirical model
Theory suggests a (negative) relation between planned retirement age and wealth that we
want to explore empirically. We focus on the relative level of wealth to (some measure of)
permanent income, sometimes in the literature referred to as wealth rates. In the empirical
7analysis wealth will be divided by permanent income, also to account for distributional
issues, as high-income households have larger wealth holdings.7





 + Xit0 + ai + t + c + it; (5)
where Ait
wi denotes the level of wealth relative to permanent income, ai is the disutility
of labor, X is a 1  K vector of socioeconomic variables. The time eects t control for
unpredicted shocks during the period of analysis that aect the planned retirement age of
all households in the same way. The cohort eect c controls for dierences in the planned
retirement age between dierent year of birth cohorts. The cohort dependent pension re-
form described above being one of these. We construct a proxy for the level of permanent
income following Kapteyn, Alessie, and Lusardi (2005). Socioeconomic attributes include
characteristics that account for the planned retirement age, such as age, gender, marital
status, number of children, education, health status, sector of employment (private or pub-
lic), pension rights and other attributes that previous studies have found to be signicant
predictors of the retirement age.
The inclusion of cohort , time  and age dummies in the model leads to an identication
problem. This is because of the identity between the calendar year (time) and the year of
birth (cohort) plus age. To solve the identication problem Deaton and Paxson (1994)
transforms the time dummies to make them independent from the cohort and age dummies.
The adjusted time dummies are based on two important assumptions. The time eects add
up to zero and the coecients are orthogonal to a linear trend. Due to this transformation,
there are no real time eects. All transitory time eects are business cycle shocks instead of,
for example, changes in preferences, and average out over time.8 In the regression analysis,
we will use the transformed time dummies as in Deaton and Paxson (1994).
If we observed all relevant determinants of the planned retirement age, the least squares
estimator of  would be an unbiased estimator of the wealth eect. The standard problem
of identifying  is that we never observe all X's, and that wealth is likely to be correlated
with the disutility of work that is unobservable.
7Previous studies have documented that the higher permanent income households have a higher level
of nancial wealth, see e.g. Diamond and Hausman (1984). Wealth rates are common controls in many
microeconometric studies, see for instance Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese (1992) and Carroll and Samwick
(1998).
8Kapteyn, Alessie, and Lusardi (2005) propose to model cohort eects explicitly instead of using cohort
dummies. They use cohort related variables like the level of GDP when the head of the household enters
the labor market.
8Our empirical strategy to control for unobserved dierences in the disutility of work ai
between households, is to exploit variation in the level of wealth and the planned retirement
age over time at the household level.
A prima facie option would be to estimate a xed eect model. This would give the
causal eect of wealth on the planned retirement age and it would remove any element that
does not vary over time. The model does not allow us to estimate the eect of other vari-
ables of interest that are time invariant, like cohort related variables, education, permanent
income and gender. Mundlak (1978) proposes to approximate the individual eect i by a
linear function of the form i =  xi
 + !i. The vector  xi includes all time averages of the
explanatory variables. The coecient 
 controls for possible correlation between the unob-
served household-specic eect i and the regressors that are assumed to be uncorrelated
to !i. This boils down to estimating an extended version of the random eect model. It is
further possible to identify the wealth eect using exogenous variation in wealth.
4 Data and descriptive statistics
4.1 Data
We use survey data from the Dutch Central Bank Household Survey (DHS) between 1994
and 2009 to estimate the eect of private wealth on the planned retirement age. The DHS
is a longitudinal study that surveys Dutch households in order to study the the economic
and psychological reasons behind saving behavior. The DHS interviews approximately 2000
households each year who participate in the CentER Internet panel. The DHS is sponsored
by the Dutch Central Bank and is conducted by CentERdata, which is related to Tilburg
University.
The DHS has a question about the planned retirement age and contains detailed infor-
mation on various types of household assets and debts. We use this information to construct
measures of household wealth. Net nancial wealth includes money in checking and saving
accounts, stocks, mutual funds, bonds, life insurance policies, annuity insurance policies,
tax-favored saving schemes and other nancial assets, net of nancial debts such as private
loans. Total wealth is the sum of net nancial wealth (which we use as dependent variable in
the models reported below) and non nancial wealth, where the latter consists of durables
goods, the perceived value of the house and other real estates net of mortgages.9
9If respondents do not know the amount of a certain component or refuse to answer the question, they
are asked to select an interval within which their asset value lay, for instance \between e 1000 and e 2000".
We use the middle value of the bracket as the value of the asset. These bracket questions reduce item
non-response and result in more accurate measures of assets values. Missing values are imputed by Center
Data. The assets are de
ated to real 2009 euros.
9Pension wealth is another important component of household wealth. This is detained in
compulsory saving accounts managed by pension funds and is not disposable. We therefore
analyze this variable in a separate study.
After dropping observations due to some missing key information our sample consists
of 23,877 observations and 7,762 dierent households. The descriptive analysis is based on
this sample. The dependent variable in the analysis is the planned retirement age of the
head of the household. This variable is based on the subjective question: \At what age do
you expect to retire, or to make use of the early retirement arrangement". This question is
asked in the rst nine waves (until 2002) only to individuals above age 50. This reduces the
sample to 7,232 observations and 2,255 households.
We work with a sub-sample of 3,881 observations and 1,290 households with non missing
information on the planned retirement age, wealth and other independent variables in the
empirical analysis.10 The rate of non response to the question concerning planned retire-
ment age is lower than the non response rates of most other variables (see for instance the
components of household wealth). The item non-response on retirement age might indicate
that households are not able to report their planned retirement to poor nancial literacy
in the pension domain. However the lower non response on retirement plans, compared to
other questions in the wealth questionnaire, suggests the opposite. The many missing items
in planned retirement age are due to the survey design, as explained above.
Table 1 reports the means and standard deviations of the main variables in our analysis.
We report these statistics for the full sample and the sub-sample with non missing infor-
mation. The table shows that both samples are quite similar when it comes to the planned
retirement age, which suggests that selection for this variable might not be an issue. The
planned retirement age of households in the sub-sample is on average 62.9 years. House-
holds in the sub-sample are on average 4.3 years older. The survey design is responsible
for this. In some years only 50 plus respondents are asked about their planned retirement.
These individuals are consequently somewhat wealthier: the level of net nancial wealth
is 0.38 permanent income higher (about e 10.300), the level of net housing wealth is 0.89
permanent income higher (about e 24,100), and they have on average six additional years
of contribution to the pension fund. Households in the sub-sample have a higher level of
education and a higher perceived health status. Other characteristics, like the sector of
employment, family size and gender are similar.
10We loose observations because of missing information about asset ownership (about 2180), non response
on the question about the planned retirement age (about 1220), missing information about permanent
income (about 1590), missing school classication (about 50), missing self reported health status (about
910) and missing information about the sector of employment (about 550).
10Table 1: Summary Statisticsa
Full Sample Sub-sample
Mean Std. Mean Std.
Planned retirement age 62.9 3.08 62.9 2.96
Total wealthb 5.39 11.3 6.68 11.1
Net nancial wealthb 2.29 2.99 2.67 3.03
Net housing wealthb 3.47 7.57 4.36 7.60
Savingsb 0.11 1.63 0.11 1.70
Years of contribution to the pension fund 17.5 12.0 23.5 11.3
Net income (e 1,000) 29.3 19.2 32.4 18.3
Permanent incomec (e 1,000) 26.0 16.2 27.1 13.1
Age 44.3 10.4 48.5 9.59
Gender (male) 0.78 0.38 0.83 0.37
Education (high) 0.39 0.49 0.47 0.50
Education (intermediate) 0.34 0.47 0.30 0.46
Education (low) 0.27 0.44 0.24 0.42
Health (good) 0.80 0.38 0.85 0.35
Health (poor) 0.20 0.38 0.15 0.35
Family size 2.54 1.39 2.46 1.32
Partner (yes) 0.67 0.44 0.69 0.45
Civil Servant 0.20 0.40 0.22 0.42
Number of observations 23,877 3,881
a Source: authors tabulations of 1994 to 2009 DNB Household Survey. Sample consists of all
households with head of the household aged 25-65. All euro amounts are in 2009 euros. The statistics
use sample weights.
b Divided by permanent income.
c Our proxy of permanent income replicates that in Kapteyn, Alessie, and Lusardi (2005), and is
therefore based on estimating income equations to predict future non capital income.
4.2 Descriptive analysis
Figure 1 plots the planned retirement age according to age for dierent year of birth cohorts.
The vertical distance among the segments indicates that younger cohorts have a higher
planned retirement age at most ages. In particular, the cohorts born after 1949 plan to
retire at an older age. This may clearly be related to the reforms of the early retirement
schemes. An important reform took place on January 1, 2006 which abolishes the scal
facilitation of pre- pension rights of individuals born after 1949. The planned retirement
age is postponed by about 1.5 years for the younger cohorts, born after 1949.
Table 2 shows descriptive data on components and distribution of household wealth for
households with the head of the household aged 40 to 60. There are many households who
have little private wealth holdings. A quarter of the households have less than e 11,000 in
total wealth and less than e 900 in nancial wealth. Half of the households have less than
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a Source: 1994 to 2009 DNB Household Survey. Sample consists of all households with head of the
household aged 45-60. The statistics use sample weights.
We use 3-year intervals to dene year of birth cohorts, with birth year 1959-1961 (1960) for the
youngest cohort up to 1941-1943 (1942). Each point on the cohort- curve represents the average age
of the cohort at the time of the survey.
e 82,200 in total wealth and less than e 9,100 in nancial wealth. This level of savings is
evidently not enough to purchase an annuity that would substantially increase retirement
income. To illustrate, a 65 year old men purchasing a e 9,100 single premium annuity at age
65 would receive a monthly payment of e 72 or e 867 per year for life, see Mitchell, Poterba,
and Warshawsky (1999). While a large fraction of the households has little nancial assets,
a relatively small group has substantial wealth holdings. A quarter of the households have
more than e 191,300 in total wealth and e 32,400 in nancial wealth. Net housing wealth is
an important asset and perhaps one of the main vehicles to accumulate wealth, 59 percent
of the households has housing equity and half of the homeowners have more than e 123,500
in housing equity.11 Households keep most of their nancial wealth in safe nancial assets,
as checking or saving accounts and invest relatively small amounts in risky assets or in fairly
11Beside this amount could even be underestimated as the period under review is characterized by a rapid
increase in wealth. The booming of the housing market might have left some individuals not aware of their
passive gains on housing wealth. House prices decreased moderately in the Netherlands as a result of the
2008-2009 recession.
12safe assets like annuities. Only a few households invest substantial amounts in these assets.
Table 2: Components and Distribution of Household Wealth with head aged 40-60a






Total Wealth 134,200 98.2 11,000 82,200 191,300 136,700 212,500
Net Financial Wealth 28,400 96.1 900 9,100 32,400 29,600 74,900
Net Housing Wealth 87,600 59.0 70,000 123,500 191,800 148,500 143,000
Safe assetsb 14,500 91.4 2,200 6,700 17,200 15,800 30,600
Fairly Safe assetsc 9,000 38.3 2,100 8,400 24,700 23,400 44,700
Risky assetsd 8,500 23.5 3,100 11,200 30,600 36,100 89,600
a Source: authors tabulations of 1994 to 2009 DNB Household Survey. Sample consists of all
households with head of the household aged 40 to 60. All euro amounts are in 2009 euros. The
statistics use sample weights.
b Safe nancial assets include checking and saving accounts, certicates of deposit and
employer-sponsored savings plans.
c Fairly safe nancial assets include dened contribution plans, the cash value of life insurances and
other nancial assets.
d Risky nancial assets include stocks, bonds, mutual funds and/or mutual fund accounts.
Figure 2 plots the level of net nancial wealth according to age for dierent year of birth
cohorts. There are two patterns which emerges from this gure. First, not surprisingly, the
level of nancial wealth increases with age, which is central to the life cycle model. Second,
there is a sharp increase in the level of nancial wealth over subsequent generations. The
level of nancial wealth for households aged 50 and born in 1949 is about e 20,600, while
for households born in 1955 the level of nancial wealth is about e 31,700. The younger
generations may use this increased level of nancial wealth to nance early retirement.
Table 3 explores the relationship between the level of accumulated wealth and early
retirement. As early retirement has become more expensive after the reforms of the early
retirement system, the dierence in the planned retirement age between households with
dierent levels of nancial wealth should be particularly apparent in more recent years. It
is also interesting to look at the relation between planned retirement age and wealth over
dierent periods as the sharp increases in wealth characterized the years between 1998 and
2004 more than the periods before or after. The table shows the ownership and average
amounts of dierent components of household wealth for those who plan to retire early
(before age 63) and for those who do not plan to retire early (at age 63 or later). Workers
who plan to retire early in the years 2005 to 2009 (and in 1998 to 2004) own signicantly
more nancial wealth than similar workers in the year 1994 to 1997. The average amount
of net nancial wealth more than doubled (e 29,400 in 1997 and e 76,900 in 2009). The
































1973 1967 1961 1955 1949 1943
a Source: 1994 to 2009 DNB Household Survey. Sample consists of all households with head of the
household aged 25 to 65. All euro amounts are in 2009 euros. The statistics use sample weights.
We use 7-year intervals to dene year of birth cohorts, with birth year 1970-1976 (1973) for the
youngest cohort up to 1940-1946 (1943). Each point on the cohort-curve represents the average age of
the cohort at the time of the survey.
dierence in the level of net nancial wealth between both groups is statistically signicant
in the years 2005 to 2009. The dierence in savings behavior between individuals who plan
to retire early and individuals who plan to retire late may also be re
ected by the ownership
of dierent assets. The table shows that workers who plan to retire early more often invest
in risky assets and housing equity in the years 2005 to 2009.
These dierences in wealth holdings between both groups, which are statistically signif-
icant for most components of wealth, give the impression that wealthier individuals plan
to retire earlier, especially in more recent years. They are not conclusive since they fail
to control for other factors, like permanent income, education and health, that are related
to both wealth and the planned retirement age. Moreover, the descriptive evidence gives
no information about the direction of causality between wealth and the planned retirement
age.
14Table 3: Wealth and asset allocation by planned retirement age (PRA)a
PRA 1994-1997 PRA 1998-2004 PRA 2005-2009
< 63  63 < 63  63 < 63  63
a. Mean value e 1000
Total Wealth 133.7 147.4 226.8* 160.5* 288.0* 200.6*
Net Financial Wealth 29.4 38.4 51.5 35.6 76.9* 42.7*
Net Housing Wealth 128.1 133.6 226.2* 173.2* 236.0* 214.9*
Safe assets 12.3 12.5 25.8* 19.6* 38.8* 24.2*
Fairly Safe assets 33.5* 43.1* 27.5 25.7 41.0* 28.7*
Risky assets 32.9 43.2 51.9* 27.0* 51.2* 28.6*
b. Asset Ownership
Total Wealth 98.3 98.5 99.4 99.6 99.4 99.8
Net Financial Wealth 96.1 95.0 99.2 98.3 99.5 99.8
Net Housing Wealth 67.9 66.6 67.3* 55.0* 79.1* 62.4*
Safe assets 92.7 89.3 98.7* 94.0* 95.7* 98.7*
Fairly Safe assets 39.6 40.2 45.1 48.4 57.3 49.0
Risky assets 22.0 27.1 32.6 28.6 37.8* 27.1*
Observations 757 428 612 313 445 624
a Source: 1994 to 2009 DNB Household Survey. Sample consists of all households with head of the
household aged 50-60. All euro amounts are in 2009 euros. The statistics use sample weights.
The sample is split up in two groups for those who which to retire early (before age 63) and one for
those who do not which to retire early (at age 63 or later). The table shows the percentages of
individuals who own a certain type of asset and the amount of wealth for those who do own a
particular asset.
T- test: * Both groups signicantly dier at the 1% condence level.
5 Results
5.1 Eect of private wealth on the planned retirement age
Table 4 shows the regression results. The rst column contains the regression estimates of
the planned retirement age without controlling for possible unobserved heterogeneity. The
second column includes time averages of the endogenous variables to account for unobserved
heterogeneity that is possibly correlated with the regressors.
We rst discuss the results for column 1. The level of nancial wealth relative to perma-
nent income has a small negative coecient of -0.073 and is signicant at the 1% level. The
coecient indicates that households that have one additional unit of permanent income in
nancial wealth (about e 27,100) plan to retire 0.073 years earlier (about 4 weeks). The
average level of permanent income is somewhat lower compared to the average net income
in the sample. We have calculated that an additional average year salary (about e 32,400)
implies 4.5 weeks earlier retirement. That is an income eect of -8.7 percent. This is com-
15Table 4: Regression results on the planned retirement age (in years)a
Random eect Mundlak specication
Wealth Measures
Net nancial wealthb -0.073*** -0.063***
Net housing wealthb -0.015* -0.007
Contributing years to the pension fund -0.021*** 0.001
Socio economic variables
Higher education 0.815*** 0.619***
Intermediate education 0.174 0.087
Poor health status -0.122 0.001
Male 0.211 0.628***
Partner 0.030 0.882***
Family size -0.018 -0.064
Civil servant -0.258* -0.206
Permanent income (e 1,000) -0.017** -0.012*
Constant 54.354*** 55.506***
Age, time and cohort eectsc
Year dummies 2
14 = 37:4*** 2
14 = 37:2***
Cohort dummies 2
9 = 84:0*** 2
9 = 71:9***
Age spline 2




Marginal eecte (weeks) -4.5 -3.9
Income eecte (%) -8.7 -7.5
Observations 3881 3881
a Source: 1994 to 2009 DNB Household Survey. Sample consists of all households with head of the
household aged 25 to 65. All euro amounts are in 2009 euros.
* is signicant at 10% level; ** is signicant at 5% level; *** is signicant at 1% level.
b Divided by permanent income.
c Age, year and cohort eects are not reported.
d The time averages include the following variables: Net nancial wealth, Net housing wealth,
Contributing years to the pension fund, Poor health status, Partner, Family size and Civil Servant.
e Relative to 52 weeks for 1 year.
16puted relating the amount of weeks shift due to a one year salary exogenous shock, divided
by 52 weeks. The small magnitude of the coecient is in line with the literature quoted
above, which suggests that the correlation between wealth and the timing of retirement is
small.
The estimated coecient of net housing wealth (-0.015) is much smaller compared to the
coecient of nancial wealth but statistically signicant. The small coecient is remarkable
given the large increase in housing prices in the observed period. The strong increase in
housing wealth could have resulted in a higher take-up of the surplus value on the house
(van der Schors, Alessie, and Mastrogiacomo 2007). This suggests that housing wealth is
of minor importance in the retirement decision, which conrms previous empirical ndings.
An explanation oered by Skinner (1996) is that individuals use housing wealth as a pre-
cautionary buer against a decline in health or widowhood and therefore do not use housing
wealth to nance early retirement.
The variable that measures the number of contributing years to the pension fund has a
negative coecient of -0.021 and is signicant at the 1% level. This indicates that households
who have contributed one additional year to the pension fund expect to retire about one
week earlier. Even though we do not know the exact level of accumulated pension wealth,
this suggests that the level of pension wealth has a negative and signicant eect on the
planned retirement age. Chan and Stevens (2004) report a negative and signicant eect of
pension wealth on retirement plans as well.
We have also added other usual controls to these specications (e.g. health status,
education, gender, marital status). As to the usual controls, the coecient for bad health
is negative but not signicant. This result is not in line with other studies. For example,
Dwyer and Mitchell (1999) show that bad health is an important determinant for the timing
of retirement. Using data from the HRS they nd that men in poor health expect to retire
one to two years earlier. A possible explanation for the non signicant eect of health on the
planned retirement age is that workers who are in poor health and therefore expect to retire
early through disability insurance do not answer the question about the planned retirement
age in the DHS. Early retirement schemes of workers in the public sector are known to
be more generous than for workers in the private sector (see Euwals, van Vuuren, and
Woltho (2010) for a detailed description of the early retirement schemes of civil servants).
Public sector workers expect to retire about three months earlier compared to workers in
the private sector. Workers with a low level of education plan to retire about 10 months
earlier compared to people with a high level of education. The family size, marital status
and gender do not have a generally signicant eect on the planned retirement age.
In order to address the possibility of unobserved heterogeneity that is correlated with
the regressors, the second column in Table 4 repeats the analysis using the extended spec-
17ication. If there are important unobserved variables such as the disutility of work that
are positively correlated with the planned retirement age and with the wealth variables,
we would expect to nd a smaller coecient for the measures of wealth. There is a small
reduction in the coecient of nancial wealth (-0.063). This suggests that nancial wealth
has a causal impact on early retirement and that individuals do not explicitly save to -
nance early retirement. If individuals end up with a larger amount of nancial wealth than
expected, than they use this increased wealth to nance earlier retirement. The coecient
for housing wealth is statistically not signicant.
The coecient for the number of contributing years to the pension fund becomes sta-
tistically insignicant. This suggests that having a break in pension contributions does not
aect retirement plans and that there are omitted variables that are correlated with the
number of contributing years. Chan and Stevens (2004) show that workers with a high
disutility of work are more likely to join early retirement schemes that have generous con-
ditions. When individuals, who have not saved sucient using their occupational pensions,
self-select themselves into generous early retirement plans this will bias the results.
Finally the signicance of the time averages in the second column (2
7 = 64:5) suggests
that there are unobserved eects that aects the planned retirement age and the observed
time varying characteristics.
5.2 Results using unexpected changes in wealth
Our results indicate that when a household experiences a wealth shock, the head of the
household expects to retire earlier. There is, however, one limitation to this result. The key
to the Mundlak estimation is that the unobserved heterogeneity is constant over time and
correlated with independent variables. However that unobserved heterogeneity is constant
after a wealth shock could be too restrictive here.
To address this concern, we make use of a question about expected wealth accumulation
in the data: \Are you planning to put money aside in the next 12 months?" Answers to
this question are grouped in 4 categories: 1) yes, certainly, 2) yes, perhaps, 3) probably not,
4) certainly not. We select all those who answer \yes, certainly" but manage to save zero
or a negative amount a year later, and those who answer \certainly not" but are observed
one year later having accumulated some wealth. Notice that we have no information on the
amount of savings targeted in one's expectations. We estimate separate coecients of the
change in wealth rates on the planned retirement age for those with expected and unexpected
wealth changes between two adjacent time periods. The change in wealth includes both
active savings and passive savings as capital gains and net transfers into the household (e.g.
inheritances). The results of this analysis are shown in Table 5.
In column 1 we consider the whole sample. This is a smaller sample relative to the
18previous estimation. This is due to missing values for savings and expected wealth accumu-
lation. The eect of a wealth change (saving relative to the level of permanent income) on
the planned retirement age is -0.040 and is signicant at the 10% level. This implies that
raising the level of savings with e 32.400 (average net income) increases the planned retire-
ment age with 2.5 weeks. Which implies an income eect of -4.8 percent. The income eect
is smaller than the previous estimations, but again in line with results from other studies
on the eect of pension wealth on retirement, see e.g. (Euwals, van Vuuren, and Woltho
2010). Column 2 isolates those who experienced an unexpected change in wealth. It shows
that an increase in savings with e 32.400 leads to a reduction of the planned retirement age
of 9 weeks. This indicates that wealth changes that are unexpected have much larger eects
on the planned retirement age than changes that might be expected.
Notice that a direct comparison with the eect of total wealth is not possible, as the eect
of the unexpected wealth change is hidden within the rest of the endogenous components
that we already discussed. This line of thinking is used also in Brown, Coile, and Weisbenner
(2010) who isolate the group of unexpected inheritance receivers. In their study the eect
of a dollar of inheritance on the probability of retiring early is more than twice as large if
the inheritance is unexpected.
Preferences for early retirement can also vary over time. For example individuals who
experience a shock in health status, may suddenly develop a stronger taste for early retire-
ment and wealth may drop at the same time. This does not undermine our results, but
poses a problem if such shift occurs between t 1 and t, that is to say between the moment
when expectations are registered (t   1) and realizations are observed (t). If this shift in
preference takes place at that time, then it is unclear whether the eect we nd is due to an
exogenous change in wealth or to a shift in preferences. We address the issue of endogenous
preferences by instrumenting wealth. In this approach the main problem is choosing an
instrument. The literature on dynamic panel data models like the one of Arellano and Bond
(1991) propose to use lags of the explanatory variable. Due to the short panel (households
are on average observed for three time periods), this strategy was unsuccessful. The drop in
observations was large and made the estimates unreliable. It is important to take this issue
into consideration when interpreting the results in Column 3 of Table 5, where most of the
interesting coecients loose statistical signicance. Due to data limitations no other strong
instruments are available. Weaker instruments, such as the occurrence of divorce delivered
unreliable results that are not worth reporting.
We take the results of the unexpected wealth change in Column 2 of Table 5 as our pre-
ferred results. We corrected for individual xed eects, including time- constant preferences
for early retirement, and we corrected for changes in behavior that may have occured before
time t-1 by using unexpected changes in wealth. We assume that the largest part of the
19shocks in wealth and savings occurs because of unexpected events unrelated to preferences
for early retirement, like unexpected drops in wealth holdings and unexpected increases in
costs of living.
Table 5: Random eect results for the planned retirement age depending on expectations





Savingb -0.040* -0.154** -0.043
Net housing wealthb -0.014 -0.071** -0.06
Contributing years to the pension fund 0.005 0.03 0.029
Socio economic variables
Higher education 0.576*** 0.855** 0.771
Intermediate education 0.068 0.290 0.554
Poor health status 0.003 0.003 -0.193
Male 0.533* 0.812 0.655
Partner 1.050*** 0.839 0.231
Family size -0.113 -0.076 -0.198
Civil servant -0.122 -1.656* -0.942
Permanent income (e 1,000) -0.022** -0.038** -0.014
Constant 58.392*** 85.407*** 101.881***
Age, time and cohort eectsc
Year dummies 2
13 = 34:5*** 2
13 = 9:8 2
12 = 8:8
Cohort dummies 2
9 = 22:5*** 2
9 = 5:2 2
8 = 6:6
Age spline 2
8 = 23:3*** 2
8 = 18:0** 2
8 = 5:1
Time averagesd 2
7 = 57:5*** 2
7 = 18:3   2
7 = 13:5*
Marginal eect (weeks) -2.5 -9.4 -2.7
Income eect (%) -4.8 -18.1 -5.1
Observations 2730 502 309
a Source: 1994 to 2009 DNB Household Survey. Sample consists of all households with head of the
household aged 25-65. All euro amounts are in 2009 euros.
* is signicant at 10% level; ** is signicant at 5% level; *** is signicant at 1% level.
b Divided by permanent income.
c Age, year and cohort eects are not reported.
d The time averages include the following variables: Net nancial wealth, Net housing wealth,
Contributing years to the pension fund, Poor health status, Partner, Family size and Civil Servant.
e Instrument is saving divided by permanent income in t   1 and t   2.
206 Conclusion
We investigate the eect of wealth accumulation on the planned retirement age. Recent
policy measures aiming to increase the labor participation of elderly workers gives individuals
more 
exibility in determining the retirement age. Private wealth holdings therefore become
more important for the timing of retirement. In addition, the level of private wealth holdings
of households has increased considerably over the last decade. Elderly workers may use the
increased level of private wealth to nance longer periods of retirement. This may lead to a
downward trend towards earlier retirement.
We nd that high wealth individuals plan to retire earlier compared to low wealth indi-
viduals. The magnitude of the association between nancial wealth (relative to permanent
income) and the planned retirement age is small, implying that the level of nancial wealth
is of minor importance for the retirement decision. When we establish a causal relation of
nancial wealth on the planned retirement age, we nd a larger eect of increased wealth in
nancing earlier retirement (an income eect of 18 percent). We have obtained this result
rst assuming a constant disutility of work and estimating an extended specication of the
random eects model, and then isolating the exogenous changes in wealth due to an unex-
pected wealth outcome. Housing wealth is an important component of private wealth, but
individuals do not seem to be using housing wealth to nance earlier retirement.
The question about subjective retirement expectations thus seems a useful variable to
study retirement behavior to control for unobserved heterogeneity in the disutility of labor.
The causal eect of wealth on the planned retirement age is not particularly large and
corresponds with earlier ndings of wealth on actual retirement behavior. In future research,
it is relevant to analyze if individuals actually retire on the planned retirement age.
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24Appendix
We show the theoretical underpinning of the statement that the planned retirement
age depends on wealth rates. The second part of the appendix exploits a quasi natural
experiment on Dutch institutions to show the eect of exogenous changes in pension wealth
on retirement age.
A.1 Relation between retirement age and wealth



















































= 0 , c(1   e rT) = Ae rzr + w(1   e rR) (12)
To investigate the households optimal retirement age we could specify the household
utility function. For instance a simple log utility Ut(ct) = log(ct).
25In order to keep the problem simple we solve for R, under the assumption that the
discount factor and the individual discount rate are equal, or that they drop out. This
results into the following rst order conditions:
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which implies a negative relation between retirement age and the wealth rate.
A.2 Dierence-in-dierence analysis of the reform of the early re-
tirement schemes
We nd that private wealth has a small eect on the retirement decision, both when we
take the stock and the unexpected 
ow. A reform of the early retirement schemes in 2006
allows us to compare the eect of private wealth on the planned retirement age (as found
above) with the eect of pension wealth. The reform reduced the early retirement rights of
individuals born after 1949 with approximately 25 percent12 and implied a reduction in the
level of pension wealth of approximately 8 percent (de Grip, Lindeboom, and Montizaan
2009).
To quantitatively assess the eect of the reduction in early retirement wealth on the
planned retirement age we take three steps. First, we estimate the average treatment eect
of the reform on the planned retirement age. This eect includes both a wealth eect and
a price eect due to change in the relative price of leisure. Second, we compute the mag-
nitude of the reduction in pension wealth using details about individuals earnings histories
in the DHS. Third, we relate the reduction in pension wealth to the change in the planned
retirement age. Given that we estimate the average impact of the reform we have to dier-
entiate between the pension wealth eect and price eect. To estimate the eect of (early)
retirement wealth on the planned retirement age we use a dierence-in-dierence strategy.
12See CPB memorandum 76, CPB, The Hague, page 3 for calculations.
26Figure 3 shows the planned retirement age for employees born in 1950 or later who
are aected by the 2006 reform and for employees born before 1950 who are not aected
by the reform. It seems that the announcement of the reform in 2005 initially leads to a
decrease in the expected retirement age for workers who are not aected by the reform and
an increase in the expected retirement age for treated workers. This does not provide any
direct evidence whether individuals postpone retirement because of the reduction in early
retirement wealth, the actuarially adjustment of the retirement schemes or because of other
eects, like macro-economic eects, changes in preferences or more awareness due to intense
discussions in the media.






























Born before Jan 1, 1950 Born after Jan 1, 1950
a Source: 1994 to 2009 DNB Household Survey. Sample consists of all households with head of the
household aged 25-65.
A dierence-in-dierence strategy allows us to isolate the causal impact of the reform
on retirement plans.13 A dierence-in-dierence estimator compares the dierence in the
planned retirement before and after the reform for households that are aected by the reform
(treatment group) and households that are not aected by the reform (control group). Since
we subtract the dierence in the planned retirement age of the control group, that is not
aected, from the dierence in the planned retirement age of the treatment group, that is
aected, we account for these common eects. We restrict our period of analysis from 2003
13See Meyer (1995) for an extensive discussion of this empirical method.
27to 2009 in order to avoid our results to be aected by earlier reforms of the early retirement
schemes, which took place from the second half of the 1990's. Further no individuals in
the treatment group after 2005 are observed before 2003 because the question about the
planned retirement age is not asked to those in that cohort before 2003.
The identication of the impact of the reform relies on some important assumptions
(Meyer 1995). First, the assignment to the control or treatment group should be independent
from the planned retirement age. People are randomly assigned to both groups on the basis
of their year of birth (e.g. born before or after 1949) which is clearly exogenous with respect
to the planned retirement age.
Second, the control and treatment group should be comparable over time in absence of
the reform. Table 6 shows summary statistics of the control and treatment group in the
period before the reform (2003 to 2004). The table shows that the workers in the treatment
group expect to retire one year later compared to the control group. This might be related to
earlier reforms of the early retirement schemes. The treatment group is younger compared
to the control group since they are separated by year of birth. The other characteristics are
quite comparable, apart from the years of pension contributions and nancial wealth, which
are both related to age.
Third, the reform should be clearly exogenous with respect to the planned retirement
age. This implies that the reform should not be implemented to oset dierences in the
planned retirement age between the treatment and control group. As we mentioned, the
reason for the reform was the very low labor participation and productivity of the elderly
workers, which is clearly exogenous with respect to the planned retirement age.
To further control for the possibility that dierences in the planned retirement age are
due to dierent characteristics in the treatment and control group, we estimate a standard
regression model for the planned retirement age controlling for these factors. Including these
control variables also increases the eciency of the dierence-in-dierence estimator (Meyer
1995). We estimate the following equation using standard regression (OLS):
yit = 0it + X
0
it1 + Mit1 + Postit1 + MitPostit2 + it (17)
where yit = Planned retirement age, it = constant, X
0
it = Vector of socio-economic
characters of household i in year t, such as age, gender, marital status, number of children,
education, health, employment status (private or public) and the number of contributing
years to the pension fund; Mit = Treatment group: equals 1 for the individuals born after
1949 and 0 otherwise; Postit = Indicator of the reform: equals 1 for the period after the
reform and 0 for the period before 2005; MitPostit = Interaction term: captures the change
28Table 6: Summary Statistics (control and treatment group)a
Control group Treatment group
Planned retirement age 61.8 1.6 63.0 2.6
Total wealthb 10.2 9.9 8.2 11.1
Net nancial wealthb 2.6 4.7 1.9 4.0
Net housing wealthb 6.7 7.6 5.6 7.5
Years of contribution to the pension fund 30.5 7.5 26.3 10.0
Net income (e 1,000) 35.1 16.6 33.9 46.0
Permanent incomec (e 1,000) 26.8 11.2 25.0 11.5
Age 56.7 1.6 52.1 2.1
Gender (male) 0.76 0.41 0.88 0.32
Education (high) 0.34 0.49 0.40 0.50
Education (intermediate) 0.33 0.47 0.32 0.46
Education (low) 0.34 0.47 0.28 0.45
Health (good) 0.81 0.41 0.81 0.38
Health (poor) 0.19 0.41 0.19 0.38
Family size 2.08 0.79 2.59 1.36
Partner (yes) 0.76 0.41 0.69 0.45
Civil Servant 0.34 0.49 0.24 0.44
Number of observations 67 146
a Source: authors tabulations of 2003 to 2009 DNB Household Survey. Sample consists of all
households with head of the household aged 25-65. All euro amounts are in 2009 euros. The statistics
use sample weights.
b Divided by permanent income.
in the planned retirement age for the group aected by the reform relative to the group
that is not aected by the reform; it = Error term that is independently and identically
distributed, with zero mean and variance 2
.
Table 7 reports the estimated coecients and the standard errors. After controlling for
the dierent characteristics of the treatment and control group, we estimate a dierence-
in-dierence eect of the reform of 0.485, although the eect is signicant only at the 10
% level. This may be due to the low numer of observations in our sample. The other
coecients of the included explanatory variables have a similar sign and coecient as in the
regression analysis but are, except for the level of education, not statistically signicant. The
reduction of pension wealth with approximately 8 percent induces households to increase
the planned retirement age on average with six months. We have calculated on the basis
of the DHS that the mean pension wealth of Dutch households is e 680,000 (van Duijn,
Lindeboom, Lundborg, and Mastrogiacomo 2008). This implies that a reduction in the level
of pension wealth with one yearly salary results in a reduction of the planned retirement
age with approximately 3.5 months. We thus nd an income eect of -28.5 percent.
29In order to interpret this result we have to dierentiate between the pension wealth eect
and the price eect. For the Netherlands, Euwals, van Vuuren, and Woltho (2010) nd
that the price eect is about three times as large as the wealth eect.14 This implies a
pension wealth eect of about -9.5 percent, which falls in the range of the estimated eect
of private wealth on the planned retirement age (e.g. between -7.5 percent and -18 percent)
and is similar to earlier estimates of the eect of pension wealth on the retirement decision.
The literature nds a income eect of approximately -11 percent for pension wealth (see
Euwals, van Vuuren, and Woltho (2010)).
Table 7: Di-in-di of VPL on the planned retirement agea
Treatment eect 0.485*
Born after 1949 0.413
Post reform -0.324
Regressors
Net nancial wealthb -0.031
Net housing wealthb -0.006
Contributing years to the pension fund 0.002
Higher education 0.995**
Intermediate education 0.619





Permanent income (e 1,000) -0.036
Constant 59.473***
Observations 675
a Source: authors tabulations of 2003 to 2009 DNB Household Survey. Sample consists of all
households with head of the household aged 25-65 and working. All euro amounts are in 2009 euros.
The statistics use sample weights.
*** is signicant at 1% level; ** is signicant at 5% level; * is signicant at 10% level.We use
heteroskedasticity- robust standard errors and cluster on the household as suggested by Bertrand,
Du
o, and Mullainathan (2004)
b Divided by permanent income.
14Euwals, van Vuuren, and Woltho (2010) evaluate the reforms of the early retirement systems in the
late 1990's towards a more actuarially fair scheme. Using data from the Dutch Income Panel Study (IPO)
between 1989 and 2000, they estimate a small but signicant pension wealth eect. They nd that a decrease
of the level of pension wealth by one yearly salary induces workers to postpone retirement by two months.
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